Hooks for application level policies on TLS connections
TLS TLSPolicy Base Class Inherit and overload as desired to suit local policy concerns
Returns a list of ciphers we are willing to negotiate, in order of preference.
Returns a list of hash algorithms we are willing to use for signatures, in order of preference.
Returns a list of MAC algorithms we are willing to use.
Returns a list of key exchange algorithms we are willing to use, in order of preference. Allowed values: DH, empty string (representing RSA using server certificate key)
Returns a list of signature algorithms we are willing to use, in order of preference. Allowed values RSA and DSA.
Return list of ECC curves we are willing to use in order of preference
Returns a list of compression algorithms we are willing to use, in order of preference. Allowed values any value of Compression_Method.
@note Compression is not currently supported
Choose an elliptic curve to use
Attempt to negotiate the use of the heartbeat extension
Allow renegotiation even if the counterparty doesn't support the secure renegotiation extension.
Allow servers to initiate a new handshake
Return the group to use for ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key agreement
Return the minimum DH group size we're willing to use
If this function returns false, unknown SRP/PSK identifiers will be rejected with an unknown_psk_identifier alert as soon as the non-existence is identified. Otherwise, a false identifier value will be used and the protocol allowed to proceed, causing the handshake to eventually fail without revealing that the username does not exist on this system.
Return the allowed lifetime of a session ticket. If 0, session tickets do not expire until the session ticket key rolls over. Expired session tickets cannot be used to resume a session.
Return allowed ciphersuites, in order of preference
NSA Suite B 128-bit security level (see @rfc 6460)
TLSPolicy for DTLS. We require DTLS v1.2 and an AEAD mode